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Abstract  
 
The paper examines the heterogeneity with respect to the impact of a financial reform - Activity 
Based Financing (ABF) - on hospital efficiency in Norway. Measures of technical efficiency and 
of cost-efficiency are considered. The data set is from a contiguous ten-year panel of 47 hospitals 
covering both pre-ABF years and years after its imposition.  
Substantial heterogeneity in the responses, as measured by both estimated and predicted 
coefficients, is found. Rank correlations between the estimated/predicted coefficients of the ABF 
dummy and the pre-ABF/post-ABF efficiencies are examined. Overall, improvement seems to be 
more pronounced in technical efficiency than in cost-efficiency. 
 
 
1 Introduction
Although not ubiquitous, numerous studies indicate negative effects of the introduction
of DRG-based prospective funding on hospitals’ length of stay (LOS) and positive effects
on efficiency. Average effects on LOS differed, but were in the range of -3 to -9% in US
studies like Guterman and Dobson (1986) and Newhouse and Byrne (1988) as hospitals
financed through Medicare shifted from activity-based retrospective funding to activity-
based prospective payment from 1984. Effects on cost efficiency varied likewise between
different studies but were in the range of 1-2% in the study of Cromwell and Pope (1989)
that utilized a sample of all PPS-financed hospitals that delivered adequate data, a total
of 5700 units per year in the period 1981-1986. Results from European studies are equally
divergent, but also here most studies indicate positive shifts in efficiency of reimbursement
reforms that introduce prospective payment based on the DRG-system. In Austria, no
effect on technical efficiency was found as funding shifted from per diem to global budgets
based on the DRG-system in 1997 (Sommerguters-Reichmann 2000), while in Portugal
the effect of the introduction of DRG-based funding on technical efficiency was positive
(Dismuke and Sena 1999), in Finland positive (Linna 2000) and in Norway positive and
in the range of 1-3% (Biørn et al. 2003). Major European countries like the UK and
Germany are now implementing DRG-based financing. However, as already concluded
by Sloan (2000) in his review of not-for profit ownership and hospital behavior, many
studies of hospital performance are plagued by endogeneity and neglected heterogeneity.
Hospitals’ responses to financial reforms are usually modelled by one coefficient. Since
this kind of model cannot represent any heterogeneity in hospitals’ responses, it will
lead to confined analyses. In this paper we address whether heterogeneity in hospitals’
responses to financial reforms exists, examine its magnitude, as well as potential expla-
nations of the heterogeneity. We utilize a panel data set that allows us to attribute
differences in response to observed variables such as the reform in the financing systems
and unobserved or latent variables. Examples of latent variables will be unmeasured
differences in technical and physical conditions (building standards, equipment, etc.),
differences in organization patterns and hospital culture, differences in quality, education
and experience of doctors, nurses, administrators, owners, differences in output mix, dif-
ferences in characteristics and needs of patients not captured by the DRG-system, etc.
How elaborate the design of such an analysis can be depends on the structure of the
panel data set, in particular the time-series length and the number of units.
Recent literature shows several studies that have taken observed heterogeneity into
account. Lo´pez-Casasnovas and Saez (1999) study the impact of teaching status on aver-
age costs in Spanish hospitals. From a multi-product hospital cost function they find that
costs are 9% higher in teaching hospitals than in non-teaching hospitals. Kessler and
McClellan (2002) study whether hospital ownership and other aspects of hospital market
composition affect health care productivity and find that higher market density of for-
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profit hospitals results in lower hospital expenditures for patients with acute myocardial
infarction. However, only few studies address the effect of reforms in the reimbursement
system on the heterogeneity in hospital response. A French study is of particular inter-
est. Dormont and Milcent (2002) study the effect on hospital costs of introduction of
a prospective payment system in French hospitals. They distinguish between transitory
and time invariant unobservable hospital heterogeneity and find that transitory hetero-
geneity is far from negligible: its estimated standard error is found to be about 50% of the
estimated standard error for cost variability due to permanent unobservable heterogene-
ity between hospitals. Simulations based on their estimations show that a cost reduction
of about 16% can be expected from implementation of a payment system which allows
for permanent unobserved heterogeneity and eliminate only transitory moral hazard.
This paper adds to the literature by studying the heterogeneous response of hospitals
to a reform in the financing system from prospective global budgets to prospective activity
based financing. We examine, first, the variation in efficiency, measured in various ways
by data envelopment analysis (DEA), across a population of hospitals, and second, the
heterogeneity in the impact of introducing Activity Based Financing (ABF) on hospital-
specific efficiency in Norway at the middle of the 1990s. The data set is from a ten-year
panel of 47 hospitals covering both pre-ABF years and years after its introduction. Data
may therefore be said to describe the results of an interesting experiment. Issues discussed
in analyzing these data econometrically are, inter alia: What characterizes hospitals for
which this reform of the financing system has had its strongest and weakest impact? Has
the efficiency of some hospitals been reduced by the reform? A review of the literature
showed no previous studies of this issue. One reason may be that an analysis of this
kind requires data for individual hospitals of a certain time-series length, which are often
unavailable. Often data only exist for two years, one pre-reform year and one year after
the reform has been effective for some time. In the present study, we in particular seek to
take advantage of the 10-year/47-hospital structure of our data set in the following way:
After having estimated, or predicted, the response coefficients we make their sample
distribution subject to a statistical investigation jointly with the sample distribution
of the efficiency measures. It follows from this that, unlike most other researchers in
this field, we are not interested in average effects of the responses only and not only in
heterogeneity in the intercept of the equations. Accordingly, heterogeneity will in the
following refer to both intercept heterogeneity and heterogeneity in slope coefficients.
The following sections are disposed as follows: In Section 2, we present the theoretical
model, derived from an assumption that each hospital manager chooses level of effort and
the labor stock so as to maximize a hospital-specific objective function. The variation in
this function’s parameters represents the heterogeneity. The data and the construction of
efficiency measures are described in Section 3. Descriptive statistics, inter alia relating to
the ranking of the hospitals by measured efficiency, are also discussed. The econometric
model version, interpreted as hospital-specific reduced-form equations derived from the
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optimizing conditions, is considered in Section 4. In Section 5 the empirical results are
reported and discussed, and we, inter alia, take advantage of the fairly large number of
units in the panel and the not too short time-series length by putting the joint distribution
of the estimated or predicted coefficients and the efficiency measures in focus. Concluding
remarks follow in Section 6.
2 Theoretical model
The theoretical model, which draws on the model framework in Biørn et al. (2003), is
reformulated to take hospital-specific heterogeneity in its coefficient structure into ac-
count. The hospital’s objective function contains three types of arguments: the utility
from treating patients, the utility of profit and the disutility of effort. Hence, the func-
tion is of the same type as in models suggested by Chalkley and Malcomson (1998).
The manager of hospital i is assumed to choose levels of effort, ei, and the number of
employees, vi, in order to maximize
Ui = ui[fi(vi, ei)] + hi[Ai + pfi(vi, ei)− wvi −Ki]− γi(ei) (1)
where ui(·), fi(·), hi(·), and γi(·) are functions which jointly determine the form of the
objective function. The function fi(vi, ei) expresses how the number of treated patients,
ni, in hospital i depends on the number of employees (only one type of employees is, for
simplicity, assumed) and the level of effort in hospital i. Heterogeneity in the production
function may for instance be related to heterogeneity in the quality of buildings and other
physical assets. The function ui(·) expresses the utility of treating patients, included to
take intrinsic motivation into account. The function hi(·) expresses the utility from
profit, where A is a fixed income component, p is a fee received per treatment, w is gross
expenditure per employee, and K is a fixed cost. Profit is included since, other things
equal, a surplus adds to a manager’s prestige and similarly, a deficit causes detriment to
his prestige. Finally, the function γi(·) captures the manager’s disutility of undertaking
cost reducing efforts. Equation (1) reflects that hospital heterogeneity is involved not
only in the production structure, but also in the disutility of effort, and in the potential
trade-off between treatment of patients, profit and effort.
Proceeding with all the types of heterogeneity in (1) makes the comparative statics
of the model intractable. Hence, for simplicity, we concentrate on heterogeneity in disu-
tility of effort, and drop the hospital subscript on the functions ui(·), fi(·) and hi(·) in
the further derivations. For notational convenience we also omit the subscript on the
variables. A parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] takes care of heterogeneity regarding the disutility of
effort; the higher is θ the stronger is, cet. par., the hospital’s disutility. The objective
function then becomes
U = u[f(v, e)] + h[A+ pf(v, e)− wv −K]− θγ(e), (2)
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where the functions u(·), f(·), h(·), and γ(·) are assumed to be the same for all hospitals.
The interpretation of the parameter θ can be indicated as follows: Say, for instance, that
the system for physicians on call is considered to be reorganized to increase the number
of surgeons available for elective surgery. The manager’s disutility related to this effort
depends on whether other types of personnel are available. If, for instance, anesthetist
nurses are in short supply, the disutility of reorganizing the surgical activities increases
both because several groups of personnel are involved, and because it may be hard to
recruit additional personnel from outside. Then θ is supposed to be large. Hospital
organizations also vary regarding mutual trust and cooperation between its management
and its employees. If suggestions for organizational changes in general are met with
strong opposition, θ is also supposed to be large.
We assume that f(·) has the following properties: fk(v, e)>0, fkk(v, e)<0 (k=1, 2),
and f12(v, e) = f21(v, e)>0, subscript k denoting the partial derivative with respect to the
kth argument. We also make standard assumptions regarding u(·), h(·), and γ(·): positive
first derivatives and negative second derivatives (denoted by ′ and ′′, respectively).
Maximizing (2) with respect to v and e gives, from the first-order conditions for an
interior solution:
u ′[f(v, e)]f1(v, e) + h ′[pf1(v, e)− w] = 0,
u ′[f(v, e)]f2(v, e) + h ′[pf2(v, e)]− θγ ′(e) = 0.
(3)
The first of these equations implies that a necessary condition for obtaining an interior
solution is [pf1(v, e)−w] < 0, which means that the fee per treatment only covers a
proportion of the cost of a marginal employee. This is in accordance with the kind of
financing system we study. The second-order conditions are:
Uvv < 0, Uee < 0, D = UvvUee−U2v,e > 0,
where Uvv and Uee are the second-order derivatives of (2) with respect to v and e, re-
spectively, and Uve is the cross derivative. Equations (3) determine the optimal v and e
as functions of the exogenous variables, i.e., reduced form equations, of the form
v = gv(p, w,A, θ, . . .),
e = ge(p, w,A, θ, . . .).
(4)
In particular, we find a negative effect of θ on e, while its effect on v is indeterminate.
We model the effect of introducing ABF as a change where an increase in p occurs
simultaneously with a decrease in A such that the previously optimal number of patients,
n0, is still feasible. Differentiating the first-order conditions (3) with respect to p and A
we find the effect on effort of a change to ABF to be:
∆ =
∂e
∂p
−n0 ∂e
∂A
=
h ′(·)
D
{θγ′(e)[f1(·)f12(·)−f2(·)f11(·)]+h′′(·)[pf1(·)−w]wf2(·)} > 0. (5)
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Hence, the introduction of ABF initiates an increase in effort. The intuition is that effort
is now more rewarding in terms of treatments and profit, since an increase in effort results
in increased income because of the increase in the number of treatments.
We are, in particular, interested in finding a relation between the initial level of effort
that stems from heterogeneity in θ and the effect of ABF on effort, i.e., the sign of ∂∆/∂θ.
The model presented here provides us with an ambiguous sign of this derivative. On the
one hand, a hospital with a small θ has a small marginal disutility of increasing e. This
pulls in the direction of a larger increase in e compared with a hospital with a large θ.
On the other hand a hospital with a small θ chooses a high e initially, which pulls in the
direction of a relatively high marginal disutility of increasing e further. Hence, we cannot
from standard economic theory decide whether hospitals with the highest level of initial
effort or the hospitals with a catch-up potential are likely to show the highest effect on
effort from the introduction of ABF. This ambiguity, which also applies to other types
of heterogeneity considered in (1), is a primary motivation for the following econometric
analysis.
3 Data and data construction
The data are panel data from 47 Norwegian hospitals in the years 1992–2001, collected by
and compiled from the Norwegian Patient Register, Statistics Norway, SINTEF Unimed,
and the Center of Health Administration at the University of Oslo. During this ten-year
period, ABF was introduced gradually for all hospitals. Efficiency data are not available,
however, so measures have to be constructed by certain procedures. Table 1 contains
definitions of the explanatory variables and specifies the data sources. In this section,
most attention will be given to describing the efficiency measures and the assumptions
underlying their construction.
Two issues are involved in establishing measures of hospital efficiency from hospital
and patient data: the measurement of outputs and inputs, and the choice of method
when establishing efficiency measures from these data. We first discuss these two issues
and then present descriptive statistics.
Input in and output from hospital production
Hospitals are multi-product firms, treating a variety of patients with a variety of inputs.
There is no consensus about how to most accurately measure outputs of hospital produc-
tion. Since the conceptual output, relative change in health, is unobservable, we proceed
by measuring health services, rather than health.
Hospital inputs are measured as:
Physician FTEs (full-time equivalents): The physician input is measured as the number of FTEs per
year. This is only an approximation to the number of hours actually worked, and may distort the effi-
ciency measures if use of overtime varies substantially between hospitals and over time. Supplementary
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evidence suggests, however, that the number of hours worked per FTE is fairly constant over the sample
period.
Other labour FTEs: All non-physician labour input is merged into one category. Attempts to use more
detailed specification of labour input did not alter the results.
Medical expenses: Medical expenses are measured in NOK 1000, and deflated to 2000 prices.
Total running expenses: Total running expenses are used as alternative input measure when providing
a measure of cost-efficiency (see below). Running expenses are measured in NOK 1000 and deflated to
2000 prices.
Norwegian hospital input and input cost data are imperfect in the sense that capital and
its costs are not included. If the use of high-cost, efficiency-improving medical equipment
has increased over the data period, the results are likely to overstate efficiency growth.
Hospital outputs are measured as:
Inpatient care: The number of discharges, adjusted for case-mix by weighting discharges by diagnosis
related groups (DRGs). Day care is included in the measure of inpatient care.
Outpatient care: The number of outpatient visits weighed by the fee paid by the state for each visit. Thus
a hospital’s revenue from outpatient care is an approximation to the volume of outpatient care adjusted
for case-mix. Outpatient revenues are included in the output vector of the DEA analysis to account for
the numbers of outpatients. We are forced to use this value-related measure because data on its volume
component are lacking for many of the large hospitals in the sample period. Since fees for outpatient
services have increased, our efficiency measures will have a positive bias. Outpatient revenue measured
in 1000 NOK (Norwegian Kroner) is deflated to 2000 prices.
The chosen output vector is highly aggregated. Thus there is an underlying assumption of
constant marginal rates of transformation (MRT) between DRGs, i.e., no (dis)economies
of scope. We return to this when discussing the method used to obtain efficiency mea-
sures, below.
Descriptive statistics for the specific inputs and outputs are given in Table 3B.
Efficiency measures
The basic efficiency concept to be used is technical efficiency (TE). A hospital is said
to be technically efficient if an increase in an output requires a decrease in at least one
other output, or an increase in at least one input. Alternatively, a reduction in any input
must require an increase in at least one other input or a decrease in at least one output.
This is the usual Pareto-Koopmans notion of efficiency. The measures used in this paper
originated with Farrell (1957) and were further developed for piecewise linear technologies
by Fa¨re and Knox Lovell (1978), Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), and Banker,
Charnes and Cooper (1984). The non-parametric mathematical programming approach
to be used in this paper has become known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). A
formal description is given in Appendix A.
One advantage of DEA is that it accommodates a setting with multiple inputs and
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multiple outputs more easily than parametric models. Moreover, this approach does not
require a specific functional form for the technology or specific distributional assumptions
for the efficiency measure. DEA measures of efficiency are susceptible to errors in the
measurement of inputs and outputs. One way of dealing with this is to use bootstrapping
techniques, or else also scrutinize data for possible errors. In order to establish efficiency
measures from the DEA approach we have used data collected and checked for errors by
Statistics Norway and the Norwegian Patient Register. Thus, we believe that sufficient
care has been shown in securing the quality of the data.
A second issue is the relationship between the level of aggregation on the output
and input side and the obtained efficiency measures. The model chosen in this paper is
quite aggregated, only separating between inpatient and outpatient care. An alternative
approach is suggested by Olesen and Petersen (2002), allowing MRTs to vary within
probabilistic assurance regions. The resulting efficiency measures will, however, heavily
depend on the specification of the assurance region. The measures obtained from the
aggregated model chosen here correspond closely to the measures used by health author-
ities to monitor the sector. Thus we believe they are sufficient as dependent variables in
an analysis of how hospitals react to policy changes.
We also express efficiency in terms of cost-efficiency (CE), by measuring inputs in
terms of costs. The measure applied equals Farrell’s (1957) measure of total efficiency,
i.e., the product of technical and allocative efficiency. When applied over a period of
time, however, a strict interpretation of this measure requires that nominal price and
wage changes are correctly deflated. In our case the only available deflator also relates
to sectors outside the health care sector. Thus changes in measured cost-efficiency may
be due to wage and price increases that deviate from the increase in the price deflator,
and not necessarily to suboptimal combinations of inputs.
For both TE and CE, two versions of the measures are considered, one imposing
constant returns to scale (CRS) on the technology and one allowing for variable returns
to scale (VRS). Formally, CRS means that a proportional increase in a unit’s inputs is
a priori restricted to bring a proportional increase in all outputs; the scale of operation
of the unit is immaterial. Under VRS, the scale of operation matters; a proportional in-
crease in a unit’s inputs will not necessarily bring a proportional increase in all outputs.
The efficiency measures we consider therefore become:
CEV: Cost-efficiency, assuming VRS.
TEV: Technical efficiency, assuming VRS.
CEC: Cost-efficiency, assuming CRS.
TEC: Technical efficiency, assuming CRS.
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Remarks on descriptive statistics
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the variables, inter alia, a decomposition into
‘between hospital’ (b) and ‘within hospital’ (w) variation expressed as shares of total
variation. For the efficiency measures considered, 60–68 % of the variation is between-
hospitals variation and 32–40 % is within-hospital variation. For the number of beds
(BEDS) the between hospital variation is as large as 98 %, while for hospital budget
per hospital bed (BUD) the between variation accounts for 39 % of the total. (Since,
unfortunately, we do not have information on budget size, we approximate BUD by total
hospital costs.) This gives clear evidence of heterogeneity in both efficiency and its po-
tential explanatory variables. The large within share for the ABF dummy (97 %) reflects
the fact the reform was introduced almost simultaneously: for 30 of the 47 hospitals ABF
became effective from the year 1997, for another 12 from 1998, for two from 1999, and
for the last three from 2000. Table 3A, containing annual means for the efficiency indi-
cators, shows that on average technical efficiency decreases slightly from 1992 to 1996,
increases substantially from 1996 to 1997 and then increases slightly from 1997 until
2000. Cost-efficiency improves slightly, with the notable exception of the years 1995–
1996 and 1998–1999. In both cases, the decline is believed to result from exceptional
wage increases. There is, however, a possibility of misinterpreting increased DRG-creep
(changes in hospital record-keeping practices that increase case-mix indexes and thereby
reimbursements) as changes in efficiency, since it is well known that hospitals, by chang-
ing their coding practices, can increase the case-mix index, thereby also hospital output,
as it is measured in this paper. Since the ‘correct’ coding is not known, it is difficult
to assess the exact effect of DRG-creep. We have, however, also recalculated efficiency
by assuming no change in case-mix since the introduction of the reform. This leads to a
somewhat lower growth in efficiency, but does not essentially alter our conclusions.
In Table 4, three kinds of correlation coefficients between the efficiency indicators are
given: overall (two-dimensional correlation), across the N = 47 hospital-specific means
(cross-sectional correlation), and across the T =10 year-specific means (time-serial cor-
relation). In all cases the association between the two indicators of technical efficiency
(TEV, TEC) and between the two indicators of cost efficiency (CEV, CEC) is strong,
in particular for the time-serial correlation. On the other hand, the TE and the CE in-
dicators are not particularly highly correlated. Comparing TEC with CEC, we find, for
example, 0.5569 for the overall correlation and 0.6807 for the between hospital correla-
tion. Remarkable is the clearly negative time-serial correlation between the TE indictors
and the CE indicators. For TEC and CEC the latter correlation coefficient is as low as
−0.7493. A marked negative association is also visible from Table 3A and it may reflect
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that measured cost-efficiency also incorporates factors that are exogenous to the hospital
management. Altogether, this supports our decision of having both kinds of efficiency
in focus. Whether or not these changes in efficiency are related to the financial reform,
and especially the heterogeneity of the responses across hospitals, will be examined in
Section 5.
Table 5 presents hospital-specific (empirical) means of the efficiency measures and
the quantitative exogenous variables, and its last column specifies the year in which ABF
came into effect. Hospital size, as measured by BEDS, varies substantially, from regional
hospitals with more than 900 beds, to local hospitals with less than 40 beds. The mean
efficiency when assuming CRS (i.e., CEC, TEC) is less than mean efficiency based on
VRS (i.e., CEV, TEV). This is quite reasonable since when assuming CRS within a DEA
procedure, more restrictions are imposed than when VRS is allowed for, and hence fewer
hospitals lie on the frontier.
Ranking of hospitals by efficiency
The ranking of the hospitals by efficiency changes substantially over the ten-year data
period. The strength of association between efficiency in any two years can be measured
by rank correlation coefficients (RCCs), i.e., coefficients of correlation of the ranking
numbers of the hospitals in the two years when arranged in descending or ascending
order [cf. Zar (1972) and Kraemer (1974)]. Table 6 reports RCCs for all pairs of years for
each efficiency measure. The RRCs of neighbouring years are in general high, but tend
to decrease with increasing time distance. The year 1997, when the ABF reform became
effective for the first hospitals, gives a characteristic example: The RCCs for this years
against 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 are, respectively, (0.81, 0.72, 0.58, 0.33) for efficiency
measure CEV, (0.81, 0.66, 0.53, 0.33) for CEC, (0.86, 0.58, 0.42, 0.29) for TEV, and
(0.89, 0.69, 0.55, 0.48) for TEC.
4 Model and method
Our theoretical reasoning in Section 2 led to a reduced form, (4), which expresses hospital
employment (v) and efficiency (e) as determined by, inter alia, the revenue per treated
patient (w) and the fixed revenue of the hospital (A). On this background and in view of
the data available, we assume that hospital efficiency is explained by the four variables
defined in Table 1. How are these variables related to those in the theory-model in
Section 2?
Standardized budget per hospital bed (BUD, where the standardization is done to
account for differences in hospital size) can be associated with the variable A in the
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theory-model, The qualitative change in the financing system can be associated with
the ABF dummy as well as with changes in the continuous variable w itself. We also
include three variables intended to represent observed heterogeneity which shifts the form
of the production function f(v, e), and hence the ‘reduced form’ equation for efficiency,
e = ge(·): the share of patient-days with irregularly long lengths of stay (LONG), and
the number of beds (BEDS). There are reasons to believe that LONG is beyond the
hospitals’ control, being affected by the volume and composition of formal care for the
elderly in surrounding local governments. BEDS is intended to represent scale effects in
the production structure not captured by the DEA-measures. We consider all the four
explanatory variables as exogenous, which may be questioned for at least two of them.
For example, improved observed efficiency may lead to increased budgets. A mechanism
of endogenous selection would also be at work, to the extent that county councils may
tend to start by imposing ABF on the hospitals from which they expected that the largest
efficiency gains could be obtained. We believe that endogenous selection is not a problem
since each county council introduced ABF for all of its hospital at the same time, and the
expected increase in technical efficiency was not an issue in the debate about the timing
of introduction.
Our basic econometric model is a regression model where the intercept and all slope
coefficients are unit (hospital) dependent. This reflects the assumed heterogeneity of
the functions ui(·), fi(·), hi(·) and γi(·) defining (1), which occur in the first-order con-
ditions (3) and therefore in the reduced form (4). The coefficient vector is considered
either as fixed and unstructured or as random coefficients, i.e., as realizations of indepen-
dent drawings from a distribution characterized by its expectation vector, representing
the average response, and its covariance matrix, representing the dispersion in the re-
sponse around this average. The estimation method is hospital-specific OLS estimation
for the fixed coefficient version and (feasible) generalized least squares (GLS) for the
random coefficient version of the model. Other examples of micro-econometric analyses
of technological heterogeneity using a panel data random coefficient approach are Biørn,
Lindquist and Skjerpen (2002, 2003). Parallel results for the CEV, TEV, CEC, and TEC
measures will be reported in order to assess the robustness of the conclusions to the way
efficiency is measured. The basic equation for hospital i in year t, to be denoted the
efficiency equation, has the form
EFFit = β0i+β1iBEDSit+β2iBUDit+β3iABFit+β4iLONGit+uit, i = 1, . . . , N,t = 1, . . . , T, (6)
where EFFit is one of the variables (CEVit,TEVit,CECit,TECit).
The possible endogeneity of BUD is tested statistically in a simultaneous model by
Hagen (1997) and in a single-equation dynamic model with lagged efficiency variables by
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Hagen and Iversen (1999). While the first study finds no feedback from efficiency to bud-
get size, the latter finds a minor effect, which can be interpreted as a cost compensation
effect (counties compensate hospitals with increasing costs). Both studies find a strong
and stable effect from budget size on efficiency, which is in line with the findings in this
article.
The random coefficient model and its GLS procedure, implemented in a stepwise
manner, is described in Appendix B, Sections 1–5. A single-equation version as well as
a system version is implemented. The latter is used for joint estimation of the efficiency
equations for the four indicators in order to improve estimation efficiency by exploiting
the particular structure imposed on the disturbance matrix by the panel design. The
convergence of iterative GLS estimation relies on empirical moments converging not too
slowly towards their theoretical counterparts. Our relatively small sample size in con-
junction with the evidence of somewhat heavy-tailed coefficient distributions (Table 8),
suggests that convergence may be slow; see McCulloch (1986).
When the hospital-specific coefficients are considered as stochastic, they can be pre-
dicted by exploiting the panel structure; see Appendix B, Section 6, for a detailed de-
scription. Predicted hospital-specific coefficients will be considered in parallel with the
hospital-specific fixed-coefficient OLS estimates when examining heterogeneity in the re-
sponses of the individual hospitals in the following.
5 Results
The main questions we seek to answer are (i) whether the introduction of ABF has signif-
icantly affected hospital efficiency, and (ii) whether the responses exhibit heterogeneity
which varies in a systematic way.
Average effects
Table 7, panel A, contains, for each efficiency measure, the OLS estimate of the coefficient
vector when assuming full homogeneity. This has the status as a benchmark case. Panel B
gives GLS estimates of the expected coefficient vector in the random coefficient model
for the four equations separately. Specific assumptions and technical details are given
in Appendix B, Sections 1–5. Panel C contains coefficient estimates when these four
coefficient vectors are estimated jointly by Feasible GLS, exploiting the restrictions on the
covariance matrix of the composite disturbance vector implied by the panel-data random-
coefficient design. The single equation GLS estimates have larger standard errors than the
system GLS estimates, which agrees with the fact that the former method is less efficient.
The coefficient estimate of the ABF dummy is positive for all efficiency indicators, and
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all three estimation methods considered. According to the OLS estimates the ABF has a
stronger effect on technical efficiency (TEV, TEC) than on cost-efficiency (CEV, CEC),
but the system Feasible GLS estimates of this coefficient does not show marked variation
with the way in which efficiency is measured.
Hospital-specific effects
The marked hospital-specific heterogeneity of virtually all variables, displayed in Tables 2,
5 and 6, signalizes that Table 7 by far tells the whole story about how hospital efficiency
responded to the ABF reform. Probably, more information could be extracted from the
data by examining hospital-specific results.
Table C1 in Appendix C is a starting point. It contains OLS estimates and standard
errors for each of the N = 47 hospitals, when taking the hospital-specific coefficients
as non-stochastic (or considering inference as conditional on the values realized). Esti-
mating four coefficients and an intercept from only T = 10 observations may give rise
to a collinearity problem, depending on the design of the regressor covariance matrix.
Attempts to extend the number of regressors to five or six, including other variables
suggested by the theory-model in Section 2, resulted, however, in ‘erratic’ and imprecise
coefficient estimates; see Neyman and Scott (1948) and Lancaster (2000) regarding the
incidental parameter problem. Therefore four regressors seems to at the maximum, and a
priori, we judge those included as the most relevant ones. Predicted hospital-specific co-
efficients obtained from the more structured and parsimonious random coefficient model
have an advantage over the hospital-specific OLS estimates, because of this degrees-of-
freedom problem. Formally, the predictions emerge as compromises between the GLS
estimates of the overall mean coefficient and the hospital-specific estimates of the unre-
stricted coefficients.
Descriptive statistics relating to the distribution of the hospital-specific ABF-coefficient
estimates in Table C1 are given in Table 8. The large (empirical) standard deviations give
prima facie evidence of strong heterogeneity of how efficiency responds to the introduc-
tion of ABF. For CEV, the mean and median coefficients are 1.87 and 2.51, respectively,
and the standard deviation is 6.38. For TEV the corresponding figures are (3.67, 2.01,
10.66), for CEC (2.44, 3.80, 5.83), and for TEC (4.00, 2.70, 8.29). The (empirical) skew-
ness and kurtosis of the ABF coefficient estimates are also illuminating. A yardstick
may be that if the latent coefficients were drawn from a normal (Gaussian) distribution,
the theoretical counterparts to these statistics should have been 0 and 3, respectively.
Positive skewness occurs in the equations for TEV and TEC, negative skewness for CEC.
The ABF coefficient estimates in the equations for cost-efficiency, CEV and CEC, have
slightly thicker tails than under normality (kurtosis 3.76 and 3.40, respectively), while
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the corresponding coefficient distributions for the technical efficiency variables, TEV and
TEC, exhibit excess kurtosis (leptokurtosis) (kurtosis 5.59 and 4.35, respectively).
Table C2 displays the effect of the introduction of ABF on efficiency, reporting for each
hospital and each indicator the OLS estimate, the t-value, and the predicted coefficient,
along with its ranking numbers (in descending order). In all respects, the ranking varies
with the way efficiency is measured. Often, however, the ranking of the estimates and
the predictions is fairly close. The majority of estimates and predictions are positive,
although with varying significance, but several negative values occur. Among the 47
hospitals, 27 have positive coefficient estimates and 30 positive predictions for the CEV
indicator (panel a). The corresponding figures for the TEV indicator are 26 and 30
(panel b), for the CEC indicator 30 and 32 (panel c), and finally, for the TEC indicator 31
and 34 (panel d). Overall, the number of positive coefficient estimates and predictions is
somewhat larger when considering efficiency measures assuming CRS than when allowing
for VRS. The ranking of the t-values supplements this picture, and it frequently departs
substantially from the ranking of the coefficients. Only about 15% of the coefficient
estimates are significantly positive according to t-tests. This low share may not come
as a surprise in view of the short time-series length. For the efficiency indicator CEV, 6
t-values exceed 2 (roughly indicating significantly positive effect of ABF-dummy) and 3
are below -2 (roughly indicating significantly negative association). The corresponding
figures for TEV are 7 and 3, for CEC 6 and 3, and for TEC 7 and 1.
The joint distribution of efficiency and ABF coefficients
Although the efficiency measures are involved in estimating and predicting the coefficient
vectors, the joint distribution of the estimates and predictions on the one hand and
the efficiency measures on the other deserves a closer examination. It is particularly
interesting for the years immediately preceding and succeeding the financial reform. This
is another way of taking advantage of the substantial number of hospitals in the panel.
Tables 9 and 10 reports for each year properties of the joint distribution across hos-
pitals of efficiency and the estimated and predicted ABF coefficients. Certain ‘marginal’
properties of this distribution have been been displayed in Table 6 (the efficiency mea-
sures) and Tables 8 and C2 (the coefficients/predictions). We now consider their joint
distribution and pose the following questions: (i) Is there a pattern in the ranking num-
bers of the year-specific efficiencies and the ABF coefficients? (ii) Do our ‘data’ support
the hypothesis that the hospitals with the lowest pre-ABF efficiency had the strongest
effect of the reform, or does it seem that those which were most efficient initially were
been most strongly affected? Since efficiency is an endogenous variable, whose observa-
tions determine all coefficient estimates, including those for the ABF-dummy, there will
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be small sample, within-hospital correlation between the two entities. However, as we
will use the results to examine between-hospital correlation and the observations from
different hospitals are, by assumption, uncorrelated, such correlation is unlikely to bias
our inference, inter alia, based on between-hospital rank correlations.
Table 9, Part A, contains RCCs between efficiency, on the one hand, and (a) the
coefficient of the ABF dummy, (b) its t-value, and (c) the predicted coefficient, on the
other. In Part B, RCCs ‘translated’ into t-values for examining the strength of the
relationship. This rescaling is convenient by giving statistics which are approximately t-
distributed with N−2 = 45 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of no association
[see Zar (1972, p. 578) and Kraemer (1974, p. 114)]. A striking finding is that for
all efficiency indicators, the RCCs shift positively from 1996 to 1997 and further shift
positively from 1997 to 1998, i.e., at about the time when ABF came into effect for the
majority of the hospitals (cf. Table 4, column 1). In 1998, all t-statistics in Part B are
between 3 and 6, which clearly supports that there is an association.
In Table 10 the quartiles of the distribution of the ABF coefficients are put in focus.
This table specifies the time path of the efficiency indicators of the particular hospitals
whose ABF coefficients are at the lower quartile (ranking number 36) and at the upper
quartile (ranking number 12). The overall picture is somewhat mixed and the table does
not invite a definite answer to question (ii) above. The results depend on (a) which effi-
ciency indicator we consider, (b) whether estimated or the predicted coefficients are used
when determining the ‘upper-quartile’ and ‘lower-quartile hospitals’, and (c) whether we
look at the absolute efficiency or at its ranking number when examining whether the ABF
reform contribute to an improvement or to a decline in the efficiency of the most and least
efficient hospitals. In fact, different hospitals are usually picked out as ‘upper-quartile’
and ‘lower-quartile hospitals’, depending on which efficiency indicator we choose and on
whether estimated or predicted coefficients are considered.
Overall, an improvement in efficiency from 1996 to 1997 is easiest to detect in the
technical-efficiency measures. For instance, the upper quartile hospital with respect to
the ABF coefficient estimate (Table 10, Part I) had an increase in its TEV measure from
89.9 in 1996 to 94.0 in 1997, and an increase in its TEC measure from 97.1 to 100.0
between the same years. For the ranking numbers, however, there is a decline from 6
to 10 in the first case and an increase from 2 to 1 in the second case. Considering the
upper-quartile hospital as it is picked from the predicted coefficients (Part II) we find
an increase in its TEV measure from 92.5 to 98.8 and an increase in its TEC measure
from 70.9 to 78.0. Again, for the ranking numbers, however, we observe a decline, from
5 to 7, in the first case and an increase, from 33 to 27, in the second case. On the
other hand, there are signs that the lower-quartile hospital had some deterioration of its
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cost-efficiency from 1996 to 1997: when judged from the predicted coefficients, a decline
in CEV from 92.2 to 88.3 (ranking numbers 3 and 8, respectively), for CEC a decline
from 81.2 to 76.6 (ranking numbers 18 and 34, respectively). Considering the estimated
coefficient, the sign conclusion is the same for CEV, but differs from CEC, which again
illustrates that the evidence is not very clear-cut.
6 Concluding remarks
Starting from a theoretical model for an optimizing hospital, we examine in this paper,
using hospital-specific panel data, the heterogeneity in the impact of the introduction
of Activity Based Financing (ABF) on hospital-specific efficiency in Norway during the
middle of the 1990s. As part of the data compilation, measures of efficiency – its technical
as well as its cost dimension – have been constructed.
When analyzing hospital data (in contrast to data for, say, regions) before and after
administrative reforms, researchers often have access to data for only two years, one prior
to the reform and one after its introduction. Our data set is richer in several respects,
inter alia because it spans a ten-year period, in which a substantial number of units, 47,
have been observed annually – giving contiguous hospital-specific time-series both before
and after the financial reform. We take advantage of this data structure by after having
estimated or predicted hospital-specific coefficients, analyze its distribution jointly with
the distribution of pre-ABF and post-ABF efficiency measures.
In particular we examine (i) whether there is a systematic pattern in the ranking
numbers of the year-specific efficiencies and the ABF coefficients and (ii) whether we can
find support to the hypotheses that the hospitals with the lowest pre-ABF efficiency had
the strongest response, or to its converse. Our theory-model predicts ambiguous signs
for these effects. The rank correlation shifts positively at about the time when ABF
financing was imposed on the hospitals. A closer investigation of the ranking numbers
and the quartiles of the distributions give somewhat mixed results. They depend on the
efficiency indicator considered, whether estimated or predicted coefficients are used, and
whether we look at the absolute efficiency or its ranking number. Overall, it is in the
technical-efficiency measures that an improvement in efficiency from the year when ABF
came into effect, can be most easily detected.
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TABLE 1. Explanatory variables. Definition and data source
Variable Operationalization Data source
ABF dummy=1 if the hospital has an ABF contract with Center for Health Administration
the county council in the current year
BEDS Number of hospital beds Statistics Norway
BUD Total hospital revenue per hospital bed SINTEF Unimed, Statistics Norway
LONG Share of total no. of inhospital days representing Norwegian Patient Register
patients with irregularly long length of stay*100
TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics for the complete panel
Variable mean std min max skew kurt b w
CEV 82.79 8.19 61.22 100 -0.1073 2.5949 0.6971 0.3029
TEV 84.39 9.63 60.85 100 0.0871 2.2896 0.6071 0.3929
CEC 80.13 8.04 58.57 100 -0.0687 2.7328 0.6776 0.3224
TEC 78.22 9.30 56.19 100 -0.1541 2.8362 0.6113 0.3887
ABF 0.447 0.498 0 1 0.2140 1.0458 0.0290 0.9710
BEDS 231.8 224.9 34 974 1.6058 4.9777 0.9857 0.0143
BUD 1846 407 951 3645 0.8877 4.7714 0.3915 0.6085
LONG 25.38 14.03 4.01 80.16 1.1893 4.2349 0.6971 0.3029
b, w = between, within hospital variation as share of total variation:
b =
T
∑
i
(z¯i· − z¯)2∑
i
∑
t
(zit − z¯)2
, w =
∑
i
∑
t
(zit − z¯i·)2∑
i
∑
t
(zit − z¯)2
.
16
TABLE 3. Efficiency indicators. Descriptive statistics, by year
A. Mean values of constructed indicators
Year CEV TEV CEC TEC
1992 83.9 83.1 81.3 76.6
1993 85.1 83.1 82.4 76.6
1994 84.7 82.0 82.2 75.7
1995 85.6 82.4 83.1 76.0
1996 81.9 81.3 79.5 75.6
1997 81.9 85.3 79.9 79.5
1998 82.6 85.2 80.4 79.8
1999 79.7 85.5 76.7 79.8
2000 80.9 86.8 77.8 80.3
2001 81.8 89.2 78.0 82.3
B. Input and output variables in DEA analyses.
Mean (standard deviation)
Year Physician Other Medical Total running Inpatient Outpatient
labour, Expenses, expenses, care, care,
FTEs FTEs 1000 NOK Mill NOK No. of DRG- 1000 NOK
weighted
discharges
1992 81.24 706.82 476.07 317.84 12609 32346
(89.34) (736.54) (594.37) (314.27) (12590) (36728)
1993 84.66 720.07 526.85 325.69 13075 33224
(96.16) (759.07) (651.68) (325.24) (13017) (38483)
1994 87.54 733.38 532.66 329.18 13085 34255
(101.07) (772.07) (700.56) (329.29) (13059) (38847)
1995 93.03 762.92 563.32 343.13 13781 36165
(106.68) (805.50) (734.33) (343.40) (13814) (41429)
1996 100.21 810.56 578.57 373.20 13951 38474
(116.74) (883.15) (785.35) (388.23) (13959) (45429)
1997 107.76 837.05 615.29 404.78 14303 46144
(131.67) (930.52) (856.02) (423.55) (14270) (53816)
1998 117.70 869.29 611.87 429.91 15318 48788
(145.22) (967.47) (807.67) (452.31) (15536) (58044)
1999 123.23 901.10 718.42 470.95 15917 52437
(151.26) (1005.89) (951.63) (491.49) (16095) (64276)
2000 129.63 934.48 690.53 482.69 16356 52881
(157.24) (1038.48) (887.20) (497.35) (16285) (62142)
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TABLE 4. Correlation coefficients of efficiency indicators
Overall (two-dimensional) correlation
(NT = 470)
CEV TEV CEC
TEV 0.6625
CEC 0.9609 0.6248
TEC 0.4781 0.8146 0.5569
Correlation between hospital-specific means
(N = 47)
CEV TEV CEC
TEV 0.8239
CEC 0.9603 0.8049
TEC 0.5464 0.7619 0.6807
Correlation between year-specific means
(T = 10)
CEV TEV CEC
TEV -0.5948
CEC 0.9747 -0.6929
TEC -0.6865 0.9816 -0.7493
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TABLE 5. Hospital-specific means and year of ABF start
Hosp. BEDS BUD LONG CEV TEV CEC TEC ABF start
no in year
1 304.0 1780.5 20.4 87.1 89.5 82.1 80.0 1997
2 50.9 1451.8 13.0 75.1 80.7 72.8 73.4 1997
3 120.6 1747.6 15.8 75.7 78.6 73.7 75.3 1997
4 176.5 1928.6 30.8 91.4 88.3 90.5 86.1 1997
5 68.9 1950.9 15.1 82.8 85.8 80.8 85.0 1997
6 279.2 1854.0 41.3 83.5 85.2 80.8 78.4 1997
7 98.9 1999.1 13.2 84.5 87.9 83.0 84.7 1997
8 107.5 1536.3 14.3 87.8 89.1 84.5 87.2 1997
9 859.4 1856.4 49.9 92.6 95.3 86.8 79.8 1997
10 134.6 1861.8 36.7 68.6 72.2 65.9 67.9 1997
11 482.3 1942.9 30.6 92.6 78.9 90.3 71.7 1997
12 117.6 2073.0 20.9 81.6 87.3 80.0 79.2 1997
13 207.7 1917.0 22.0 80.7 77.8 76.4 70.3 1997
14 44.7 2143.1 13.9 75.8 83.4 75.4 82.5 1997
15 203.6 2010.3 31.4 85.1 87.5 80.9 79.2 1997
16 368.9 2419.4 20.9 85.8 88.4 82.9 74.4 1997
17 493.9 2048.5 25.7 82.5 91.9 79.3 82.5 1997
18 361.9 1865.5 24.1 87.6 90.0 81.6 77.9 1999
19 89.1 1780.7 18.0 81.4 82.3 78.7 80.8 1999
20 530.0 2820.1 22.2 77.8 76.2 69.1 60.9 1997
21 793.8 2208.7 52.1 86.5 79.9 82.1 64.6 1997
22 443.9 1965.8 46.8 78.2 78.3 73.6 66.0 1997
23 197.9 1535.9 55.8 72.3 69.5 69.3 64.9 1997
24 47.1 1926.9 11.4 86.6 92.9 86.1 91.0 1997
25 40.4 1586.0 13.6 87.4 93.5 85.3 88.3 1997
26 306.9 1923.6 21.9 84.6 86.5 78.8 75.6 1997
27 77.8 1799.9 24.1 87.3 85.5 85.1 84.9 1998
28 36.8 2222.0 22.0 72.9 79.2 72.3 77.8 1998
29 73.1 1791.9 24.8 76.3 72.8 75.4 72.4 1998
30 315.6 1903.7 31.2 85.8 89.0 84.8 81.5 1998
31 78.6 1675.4 38.1 81.9 84.9 81.1 84.2 1998
32 56.6 1673.2 29.0 80.0 83.3 79.5 83.0 1998
33 64.0 1803.5 20.6 71.4 69.3 70.7 68.5 1998
34 113.0 1854.9 16.3 66.4 66.7 64.2 65.7 1997
35 244.7 1840.1 20.1 86.2 87.1 81.1 78.3 1997
36 66.5 1409.9 24.8 88.3 91.5 87.2 90.4 1997
37 323.1 1772.2 22.5 94.9 96.7 93.7 90.9 1997
38 242.4 1765.3 28.2 89.1 95.5 84.5 83.3 1997
39 651.9 1799.3 51.6 89.3 98.5 85.1 81.7 1997
40 66.0 1763.5 20.6 78.5 77.0 78.2 75.7 1998
41 89.1 1709.7 11.9 83.0 80.6 82.4 80.1 1998
42 56.5 1347.1 15.0 77.7 78.4 76.1 74.8 1998
43 154.8 1426.5 32.6 92.0 86.4 90.0 79.5 1998
44 939.3 1838.5 36.5 98.1 95.9 92.2 77.7 1998
45 51.8 1643.6 8.2 81.7 87.5 80.8 84.2 2000
46 47.0 1790.2 14.0 77.8 84.7 77.4 81.8 2000
47 215.0 1816.3 18.8 76.9 78.7 73.9 72.2 2000
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TABLE 6. Rank correlation coefficients of efficiency across hospitals,
by pair of years
A. Efficiency indicator: CEV
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1992 1.000
1993 0.848 1.000
1994 0.755 0.833 1.000
1995 0.738 0.822 0.916 1.000
1996 0.752 0.771 0.881 0.910 1.000
1997 0.572 0.612 0.718 0.771 0.816 1.000
1998 0.559 0.516 0.654 0.623 0.662 0.805 1.000
1999 0.732 0.668 0.805 0.774 0.845 0.717 0.778 1.000
2000 0.754 0.639 0.706 0.653 0.743 0.568 0.655 0.875 1.000
2001 0.529 0.435 0.515 0.466 0.443 0.330 0.470 0.657 0.764 1.000
B. Efficiency indicator: TEV
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1992 1.000
1993 0.875 1.000
1994 0.758 0.789 1.000
1995 0.676 0.648 0.827 1.000
1996 0.514 0.534 0.624 0.796 1.000
1997 0.452 0.468 0.627 0.694 0.830 1.000
1998 0.475 0.463 0.688 0.748 0.751 0.862 1.000
1999 0.491 0.546 0.695 0.641 0.579 0.577 0.755 1.000
2000 0.390 0.438 0.507 0.526 0.452 0.415 0.600 0.778 1.000
2001 0.386 0.397 0.435 0.398 0.248 0.287 0.450 0.634 0.595 1.000
C. Efficiency indicator: CEC
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1992 1.000
1993 0.835 1.000
1994 0.759 0.816 1.000
1995 0.768 0.787 0.927 1.000
1996 0.789 0.752 0.883 0.914 1.000
1997 0.566 0.579 0.731 0.773 0.775 1.000
1998 0.558 0.510 0.694 0.690 0.667 0.810 1.000
1999 0.759 0.679 0.771 0.762 0.805 0.655 0.786 1.000
2000 0.748 0.635 0.688 0.657 0.728 0.528 0.666 0.911 1.000
2001 0.564 0.461 0.463 0.396 0.453 0.330 0.518 0.741 0.832 1.000
D. Efficiency indicator: TEC
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1992 1.000
1993 0.821 1.000
1994 0.652 0.731 1.000
1995 0.582 0.610 0.815 1.000
1996 0.468 0.533 0.662 0.811 1.000
1997 0.441 0.509 0.741 0.769 0.855 1.000
1998 0.370 0.412 0.708 0.731 0.700 0.886 1.000
1999 0.389 0.517 0.695 0.673 0.580 0.687 0.777 1.000
2000 0.364 0.495 0.608 0.612 0.502 0.551 0.633 0.828 1.000
2001 0.475 0.513 0.550 0.443 0.403 0.476 0.525 0.689 0.726 1.000
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TABLE 7. Efficiency equations.
Coefficient estimates based on full sample
Standard errors in parenthesis∗)
A. Homogeneous model. OLS estimates
CEV TEV CEC TEC
CONST 94.498 88.526 94.375 88.776
(1.945) (2.476) (1.945) (2.476)
BEDS 2.093 1.652 1.482 -0.329
(0.181) (0.230) (0.181) (0.230)
BUD -7.919 -3.773 -8.774 -5.124
(1.077) (1.371) (1.077) (1.371)
ABF 0.996 5.479 1.128 6.284
(0.843) (1.073) (0.843) (1.073)
LONG -0.094 -0.136 -0.078 -0.124
(0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.036)
∗) The OLS standard error estimates are obtained
from the ‘standard’ formulae, which disregard
coefficient heterogeneity, and hence are
incomparable with those in panels B and C.
B. Heterogeneous, random coefficient model.
Single-equation GLS estimates of expected coefficients
CEV TEV CEC TEC
CONST 108.180 64.881 111.508 59.569
(12.282) (15.053) (11.679) (14.654)
BEDS -6.839 7.179 -8.217 9.724
(12.068) (12.999) (11.504) (13.670)
BUD -8.529 5.298 -10.408 4.666
(2.693) (3.554) (2.653) (3.214)
ABF 1.458 2.895 2.031 3.651
(1.060) (1.691) (0.977) (1.371)
LONG -0.036 0.060 -0.056 0.042
(0.066) (0.112) (0.061) (0.102)
C. Heterogeneous, random coefficient model.
System GLS estimates of expected coefficients
CEV TEV CEC TEC
CONST 110.821 77.532 112.859 69.986
(11.699) (14.147) (11.151) (13.805)
BEDS -3.466 -6.015 -6.886 -5.334
(11.673) (12.341) (11.119) (13.082)
BUD -9.563 5.424 -10.238 4.854
(2.538) (3.300) (2.519) (2.961)
ABF 3.270 2.659 3.664 3.072
(0.948) (1.567) (0.869) (1.232)
LONG -0.050 0.003 -0.078 0.042
(0.059) (0.104) (0.055) (0.094)
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TABLE 8. Distribution of the N=47 hospital-specific
OLS estimates, each based on T =10 observations.
Descriptive statistics
A. Coefficients in equation for efficiency indicator CEV
CONST BEDS BUD ABF LONG
Mean 124.896 -17.593 -10.892 1.869 -0.081
St.dev. 79.130 79.645 17.059 6.384 0.393
Skew -0,000 -0.648 0.23 -0.414 -0.387
Kurt 7.501 8.073 5.035 3.764 4.176
B. Coefficients in equation for efficiency indicator TEV
CONST BEDS BUD ABF LONG
Mean 68.802 4.545 4.525 3.670 0.053
St.dev. 96.462 84.588 22.549 10.655 0.711
Skew -0.762 0.566 0.336 1.332 -0.248
Kurt 4.174 5.565 3.885 5.586 4.315
C. Coefficients in equation for efficiency indicator: CEC
CONST BEDS BUD ABF LONG
Mean 126.705 -18.012 -12.431 2.443 -0.101
St.dev. 75.329 75.915 16.936 5.826 0.366
Skew -0.327 -0.246 0.429 -0.517 -0.849
Kurt 6.983 7.376 4.730 3.403 4.634
D. Coefficients in equation for efficiency indicator TEC
CONST BEDS BUD ABF LONG
Mean 58.195 8.755 4.762 3.995 0.060
St.dev. 93.969 89.624 20.157 8.289 0.641
Skew -0.764 0.614 1.096 0.847 0.363
Kurt 4.981 5.383 4.473 4.358 4.810
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TABLE 9. Strength of association between ABF coefficient and efficiency.
Rank correlation across hospitals
A. Rank correlation coefficients
a. Estimated coefficient of ABF dummy versus efficiency, by year
Effic.ind. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CEV 0.224 0.127 0.183 0.150 0.126 0.380 0.624 0.265 0.331 0.318
TEV 0.043 -0.084 0.206 0.111 0.070 0.267 0.484 0.192 0.203 0.171
CEC 0.331 0.194 0.348 0.339 0.264 0.524 0.640 0.333 0.369 0.392
TEC 0.008 -0.112 0.293 0.174 0.017 0.284 0.518 0.301 0.283 0.143
b. t-value of ABF dummy coefficient versus efficiency, by year
Effic.ind. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CEV 0.164 0.066 0.127 0.101 0.059 0.342 0.596 0.214 0.261 0.258
TEV 0.015 -0.088 0.207 0.119 0.057 0.245 0.475 0.213 0.220 0.229
CEC 0.319 0.185 0.291 0.300 0.203 0.506 0.628 0.312 0.321 0.325
TEC -0.028 -0.098 0.252 0.121 -0.025 0.238 0.447 0.226 0.199 0.065
c. Predicted coefficient of ABF dummy versus efficiency, by year
Effic.ind. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CEV 0.147 0.039 0.151 0.112 0.091 0.336 0.627 0.288 0.320 0.334
TEV 0.022 -0.117 0.204 0.136 0.109 0.253 0.481 0.202 0.192 0.148
CEC 0.217 0.103 0.298 0.269 0.202 0.494 0.670 0.341 0.349 0.387
TEC -0.050 -0.198 0.237 0.131 -0.035 0.243 0.480 0.259 0.240 0.093
B. t-value counterpart to rank correlation coefficients
a. Estimated coefficient of ABF dummy versus efficiency, by year
Effic.ind. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CEV 1.541 0.856 1.249 1.020 0.849 2.759 5.353 1.843 2.352 2.247
TEV 0.286 0.563 1.411 0.752 0.469 1.860 3.713 1.310 1.391 1.161
CEC 2.356 1.326 2.488 2.416 1.840 4.125 5.583 2.370 2.666 2.858
TEC 0.050 0.754 2.052 1.185 0.116 1.984 4.063 2.117 1.980 0.967
b. t-value of ABF dummy coefficient versus efficiency, by year
Effic.ind. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CEV 1.118 0.445 0.855 0.678 0.393 2.438 4.983 1.472 1.816 1.793
TEV 0.099 0.595 1.418 0.801 0.380 1.692 3.626 1.465 1.514 1.579
CEC 2.259 1.261 2.039 2.113 1.389 3.935 5.418 2.200 2.271 2.302
TEC 0.190 0.659 1.746 0.818 0.170 1.644 3.351 1.554 1.366 0.434
c. Predicted coefficient of ABF dummy versus efficiency, by year
Effic.ind. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CEV 0.997 0.259 1.023 0.758 0.614 2.392 5.394 2.020 2.263 2.378
TEV 0.148 0.792 1.398 0.921 0.737 1.754 3.682 1.382 1.312 1.006
CEC 1.494 0.694 2.096 1.872 1.381 3.811 6.056 2.432 2.500 2.814
TEC 0.338 1.354 1.638 0.885 0.234 1.683 3.673 1.799 1.657 0.625
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TABLE 10. Efficiency of hospital whose ABF coefficient is
at the lower (L) and at the upper (U) quartile.
RL=ranking no. of L, RU=ranking no. of U (1=highest).
E=Estimated coefficient, P=Predicted coefficient
I. Quartiles related to estimated coefficients
A. Efficiency indicator: CEV. L=Hospital no. 41, U=Hospital no. 18
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 E P
L 87.7 84.8 83.6 83.1 84.5 81.9 78.8 81.9 84.3 79.8 -1.7 -1.2
U 91.5 92.3 89.1 95.7 86.4 84.5 88.0 82.7 83.2 82.2 5.8 3.0
RL 18 25 28 31 17 27 35 16 16 30 36 35
RU 12 11 16 7 14 18 14 14 19 21 12 17
B. Efficiency indicator: TEV. L=Hospital no. 21, U=Hospital no. 9
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 E P
L 82.7 77.2 71.1 74.7 73.6 75.7 80.1 80.2 99.9 83.6 -2.2 -2.0
U 100.0 96.0 94.9 94.4 89.9 94.0 94.8 96.1 93.0 100.0 6.8 4.8
RL 27 33 42 37 39 40 36 31 5 35 36 37
RU 3 5 5 5 6 10 10 8 17 2 12 13
C. Efficiency indicator: CEC. L=Hospital no. 24, U=Hospital no. 5
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 E P
L 78.4 89.3 90.3 96.2 88.9 90.0 89.3 86.8 78.8 72.6 -1.2 0.0
U 78.4 80.7 84.4 85.5 80.6 84.9 81.7 77.0 80.7 74.6 6.3 5.3
RL 29 12 9 4 5 4 7 5 21 35 36 32
RU 30 28 18 16 21 11 23 24 17 29 12 9
D. Efficiency indicator: TEC. L=Hospital no. 3, U=Hospital no. 37
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 E P
L 73.3 71.8 71.9 76.6 80.3 79.3 75.8 74.2 71.2 79.0 -1.2 -0.5
U 77.7 80.2 88.0 92.1 97.1 100.0 100.0 91.1 91.0 91.4 9.3 9.4
RL 30 33 34 23 11 21 31 35 37 31 36 39
RU 23 20 1 2 2 1 1 6 8 8 12 10
II. Quartiles related to predicted coefficients
A. Efficiency indicator: CEV. L=Hospital no. 43, U=Hospital no. 10
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 E P
L 92.7 96.3 97.0 100.0 92.2 88.3 85.0 90.5 90.4 87.4 -1.3 -1.4
U 65.8 65.0 67.6 65.1 65.1 69.4 73.8 70.9 72.9 71.0 6.4 4.4
RL 9 3 2 2 3 8 17 3 6 12 34 36
RU 46 45 47 47 47 45 40 42 39 44 11 12
B. Efficiency indicator: TEV. L=Hospital no. 35, U=Hospital no. 38
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 E P
L 100.0 95.9 91.3 89.7 77.7 81.5 82.5 84.7 83.2 84.3 -0.8 -1.9
U 100.0 98.1 95.4 92.6 92.5 98.8 97.4 92.0 100.0 88.7 10.9 5.0
RL 2 6 9 10 33 28 27 21 29 34 30 36
RU 5 3 4 7 5 7 9 15 2 26 9 12
C. Efficiency indicator: CEC. L=Hospital no. 19, U=Hospital no. 37
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 E P
L 80.0 75.6 78.6 81.8 81.2 76.5 77.4 77.6 77.7 80.7 -4.9 -0.5
U 86.9 90.2 95.7 100.0 99.9 99.2 100.0 87.4 89.4 88.0 5.3 5.0
RL 27 40 34 28 18 34 32 20 23 15 41 36
RU 14 8 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 7 19 12
D. Efficiency indicator: TEC. L=Hospital no. 19, U=Hospital no. 44
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 E P
L 82.3 78.8 74.9 80.0 78.6 78.6 77.1 82.7 84.4 90.9 -3.8 -0.2
U 71.2 74.4 71.2 72.7 70.9 78.0 87.5 89.0 81.5 80.6 10.4 8.9
RL 14 22 29 13 20 24 28 16 15 9 42 36
RU 32 28 36 35 33 27 11 7 23 28 11 12
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Appendix A: Constructing efficiency measures
Formally, the (TE and CE) measures are derived by first defining the reference technology relative
to which efficiency is measured. Let y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ Rm+ denote a vector of outputs and
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+ denote a vector of inputs. We let N be the number of hospitals, Y is the
(N ×m) matrix of observed outputs, whose ith row represents y for hospital i, X is the (N ×n)
matrix of observed inputs, whose ith row represents x for hospital i, and λ = (λ1, . . . , λN ) is
the intensity vector for the N hospitals. Assuming CRS we can obtain a (scalar) measure of
input-saving efficiency (for unit 0 say), θ, by solving the following LP problem:
min
θ,λ
(θ) subject to

λY ≥ y0,
λX ≤ θx0,
λ ≥ 0.
A measure of input saving efficiency assuming variable returns to scale is obtained by restricting
the sum of the intensity variables to be equal to 1: λ ι = 1, ι denoting the (N × 1) unit vector.
The efficiency frontier is constructed from a pooled set of observations, i.e., an intertemporal
efficiency frontier is computed (Harris, Ozgen, and Ozcan, 2000, Tulkens and van den Eeckaut,
1993). We do this in order to be able to compare efficiency between years.
Appendix B: Estimation and coefficient prediction
In this appendix we describe the estimation procedures for the random coefficient multi-equation
model (Sections 1–5) and the procedure for predicting the unit (hospital) specific coefficients from
the estimation results (Section 6).
1. Model and notation. We consider a linear, static panel data regression model for N
units (hospitals) observed in T periods (years), with G equations. Equation g has Kg regressors
(including a one associated with the intercept) and a distinct coefficient vector, so that the total
number of coefficients is K =
∑G
g=1Kg. Let, for Equation g (g = 1, . . . , G), unit i (i = 1, . . . , N),
period t (t = 1, . . . , T ), the (T × 1) vector of observations of the regressand be ygi, the (T ×Kg)
regressor matrix be Xgi (including a vector of ones associated with the intercept), and ugi
be a zero mean (T × 1) vector of disturbances. We allow for unit-specific heterogeneity to be
represented, for equation g, unit i, by the random coefficient vector
βgi = βg + δgi, (B.1)
where βg is a fixed constant vector and δgi its random shift variable with zero mean. We assume
that Xgi, ugi, and δgi are mutually independent, that ugi and δgi are independent and that
E[δgiδ
′
hi] = Σ
δ
gh, E[ugiu
′
hi] = σ
u
ghIT , g, h = 1, . . . , G, (B.2)
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where 0m,n is the (m× n) zero matrix and Im is the m-dimensional identity matrix. Equation g
for unit i is
ygi =Xgiβgi + ugi =Xgiβg + ηgi, ηgi =Xgiδgi + ugi,
g = 1, . . . , G,
i = 1, . . . , N. (B.3)
It follows from (B.2) that E[ηgiη
′
hi] =XgiΣ
δ
ghX
′
hi + σughIT . Let
Σu =
 σu11 · · · σu1G... ...
σuG1 · · · σuGG
 , Σδ =
 Σδ11 · · · Σδ1G... ...
ΣδG1 · · · ΣδGG
 , Xi =
 X1i · · · 0... . . . ...
0 · · · XGi
 ,
of dimensions (G×G), (K×K), and (GT ×K), respectively, and let yi = (y ′1i, . . . ,y′Gi)′, β =
(β′1, . . . ,β
′
G)
′, δi = (δ
′
1i, . . . , δ
′
Gi)
′, ui = (u
′
1i, . . . ,u
′
Gi)
′, ηi = (η
′
1i, . . . ,η
′
Gi)
′. We can then write
the model more compactly as
yi =Xiβ + ηi, ηi =Xiδi + ui, (B.4)
V(δi) = Σ
δ, V(ui) = IT ⊗Σu, V(ηi) = Ωi =XiΣδX ′i + IT ⊗Σu, (B.5)
where V denotes the covariance matrix and ⊗ is the Kronecker product operator.
2. First step, OLS, estimation of βgi and β. Consider first OLS estimation of the unit and
equation-specific coefficients βgi (in a fixed coefficients setting, or conditional on the unit-specific
coefficient vector) and the full expected coefficient vector β (in a random coefficients setting).
The vector of OLS estimators for unit i is [this presumes that T > Kg for all g]
β̂i =
 β̂1i...
β̂Gi
 = [X ′iXi]−1X ′iyi =
 (X ′1iX1i)−1X ′1iy1i...
(X ′GiXGi)
−1X ′GiyGi
 , i = 1, . . . , N. (B.6)
A first-step estimator of the common expectation of the unit-specific coefficient vectors, β, based
on observations of all units is the unweighted mean
β̂ = 1N
∑N
i=1 β̂i =
1
N
∑N
i=1[X
′
iXi]−1[X
′
iyi]. (B.7)
3. First step estimation of Σu and Σδ from OLS residuals. We construct
ûi =
 û1i...
ûGi
 = yi −Xiβ̂i, Û i =
 û′1i...
û′Gi
 ,
where element (g, t) in the (G × T ) matrix Û i is the t’th OLS residual of unit i in the g’th
equation. We estimate Σu and Σδ by
Σ̂
u
= 1NT
∑N
i=1 Û iÛ
′
i, Σ̂
δ
= 1N
∑N
i=1(β̂i − β̂)(β̂i − β̂) ′. (B.8)
These estimators are consistent if both T and N go to infinity and are always positive definite; Σ̂
δ
,
however, is biased in finite samples. Other estimators exist; see Hsiao (2003, p. 146). Inserting
Σ̂
u
and Σ̂
δ
into (B.7), we get the following estimator of Ωi:
Ω̂i =XiΣ̂
δ
X ′i + IT ⊗ Σ̂
u
, i = 1, . . . , N. (B.9)
4. Second step, GLS, estimation of βi and β. Having estimated all the Ωi’s from (B.9),
(asymptotically) more efficient estimators of βi than β̂i, and corresponding estimators of the
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common expected coefficient vector β, can be obtained as follows. The GLS estimator of βi and
its covariance matrix are
β˜i = [X
′
iΩ
−1
i Xi]
−1[X ′iΩ
−1
i yi], (B.10)
V(β˜i) = [X
′
iΩ
−1
i Xi]
−1, i = 1, . . . , N. (B.11)
A corresponding GLS estimator of β based on observations from all units is
β˜=
[∑N
i=1 V(β˜i)
−1
]−1[∑N
i=1 V(β˜i)
−1β˜i
]
=
[∑N
i=1X
′
iΩ
−1
i Xi
]−1[∑N
i=1X
′
iΩ
−1
i yi
]
, (B.12)
which is a matrix weighted mean of all the β˜i’s and is the minimum variance linear unbiased
estimator (MVLUE) of β. Its covariance matrix is
V(β˜) =
[∑N
i=1 V(β˜i)
−1
]−1
=
[∑N
i=1X
′
iΩ
−1
i Xi
]−1
. (B.13)
The FGLS estimators of βi (conditional on unit i) and β (unconditional mean) and their esti-
mated covariance matrices are obtained by inserting (B.9) into (B.10)–(B.13).
5. Second step estimation of Σu and Σδ from GLS residuals. The GLS estimators β˜i
can be used to revise the estimators of the disturbance covariance matrices and the covariance
matrices of the random coefficients obtained in the first step, i.e., Σ̂
u
and Σ̂
δ
.
We construct the (GT × 1) GLS residual vector corresponding to ui from
u˜i =
 u˜1i...
u˜Gi
 = yi −Xiβ˜i, U˜ i =
 u˜′1i...
u˜′Gi
 .
The second step estimator of Σu and Σδ are
Σ˜
u
= 1NT
∑N
i=1 U˜ iU˜
′
i, Σ˜
δ
= 1N
∑N
i=1(β˜i − β˜)(β˜i − β˜)′. (B.14)
Recompute the overall estimator of Ωi by
Ω˜i =XiΣ˜
δ
X ′i + IT ⊗ Σ˜
u
, i = 1, . . . , N. (B.15)
Revised FGLS estimators of βi and β and their estimated covariance matrices are obtained by
inserting (B.15) into (B.10)–(B.13).
6. Prediction of coefficients. The random coefficient vector of unit i, βi, is predicted by
means of
β∗i = β˜+Σ
δX ′iΩ
−1
i (yi−Xiβ˜)= β˜+ΣδX ′i(XiΣδX ′i+IT⊗Σu)−1(yi−Xiβ˜), (B.16)
cf. Lee and Griffiths (1979, section 4) and Hsiao (2003, p. 147). It has the interpretation as the
minimum variance linear unbiased predictor (MVLUP) of the stochastic variable βi. Combining
(B.16) with (B.10) this predictor can be rewritten as
β∗i = Aiβ˜i + (IK−Ai)β˜, (B.17)
where
Ai = ΣδV(β˜i)
−1 = ΣδX ′iΩ
−1
i Xi = Σ
δX ′i(XiΣ
δX ′i + IT ⊗Σu)−1Xi. (B.18)
Eqs. (B.17) and (B.18) show that the predictor β∗i can be interpreted as a matrix weighted mean
of the unit-specific GLS estimator β˜i and the overall GLS estimator β˜. The predictor is ‘closer to’
the unit-specific GLS estimator, i.e., Ai is ‘large’ in relation to IK , (i) the ‘larger’ is the dispersion
of the random coefficient vector, as measured by Σδ, and (ii) the ‘more certain’ is the unit-specific
GLS estimator, as measured by the inverse of its covariance matrix V(β˜i)−1 = X
′
iΩ
−1
i Xi. It
is closer to the estimator of the common expected coefficient when ΣδV(β˜i)−1 is ‘small’ relative
to IK . Intuitively, this is quite reasonable. We obtain the numerical values of the predicted
coefficients reported in the text by inserting (B.9), or (B.15), into (B.16).
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Appendix C: Supplementary tables
TABLE C1. Hospital-specific OLS estimates and standard errors
a. Efficiency indicator: CEV
Hosp. Coefficient estimates Standard errors
no. CONST BEDS BUD ABF LONG CONST BEDS BUD ABF LONG
1 100.699 0.230 -5.756 2.814 -0.269 16.187 3.139 11.631 6.093 0.309
2 86.642 -8.348 -2.162 -8.719 0.017 82.313 113.999 19.442 8.224 0.227
3 81.012 -5.143 -0.007 -7.255 0.290 19.272 10.576 6.083 3.188 0.373
4 200.091 -30.263 -33.957 8.634 0.192 48.734 19.658 11.506 3.896 0.261
5 136.937 -24.074 -16.418 5.727 -0.553 34.866 50.976 10.094 3.175 0.271
6 123.778 -6.310 -10.574 1.802 -0.097 74.555 27.405 6.195 3.587 0.128
7 137.160 -31.729 -15.551 8.934 0.408 65.339 62.708 7.805 8.823 0.481
8 90.581 6.015 -4.078 -4.647 -0.045 29.594 31.795 6.507 3.063 0.171
9 126.201 -5.753 2.423 4.252 0.184 62.295 3.467 14.532 6.713 0.379
10 64.650 -1.128 0.311 6.418 0.047 28.269 17.344 4.025 2.850 0.065
11 164.360 -0.597 -29.763 14.861 -0.603 108.782 8.409 23.770 9.168 1.034
12 187.316 -43.015 -23.581 8.027 -0.492 32.837 13.785 7.362 4.103 0.569
13 143.658 -11.182 -17.948 -1.016 -0.219 72.623 22.700 11.203 3.399 0.425
14 140.459 -75.025 -17.415 11.995 0.013 44.786 63.451 10.075 5.883 0.442
15 91.799 1.309 -8.636 -3.592 0.312 14.951 5.808 5.958 3.177 0.179
16 177.138 -12.831 -15.351 -0.965 -0.304 146.134 21.541 19.849 12.933 1.529
17 124.807 0.700 -18.728 7.891 -0.442 19.644 0.901 5.354 2.411 0.444
18 126.868 0.700 -21.186 5.776 -0.168 34.078 9.991 13.324 8.467 0.578
19 154.743 -108.522 10.423 -2.106 0.300 95.108 118.122 12.752 5.897 0.298
20 27.985 2.212 7.482 -8.142 0.952 78.542 6.500 14.691 13.740 1.032
21 165.131 -5.900 -15.685 8.673 -0.029 26.310 1.975 5.435 3.572 0.110
22 91.445 -2.124 -5.253 -0.948 0.150 29.461 3.230 8.291 3.685 0.103
23 118.570 -21.209 -3.345 -4.001 0.051 50.037 18.392 9.533 3.266 0.074
24 173.111 -110.220 -15.613 -1.447 -0.332 36.387 66.600 7.209 8.450 0.634
25 1.044 179.056 6.966 3.373 0.094 48.421 106.011 12.107 4.782 0.069
26 110.302 -10.766 19.273 -18.158 -0.943 80.830 18.655 13.960 6.870 0.478
27 398.845 -308.028 -44.050 8.520 0.166 240.620 253.102 28.208 10.219 0.303
28 98.610 -73.514 0.844 14.453 -0.287 77.994 139.864 17.397 7.047 0.221
29 144.860 -39.577 -16.880 -3.501 -0.324 48.515 38.345 13.631 5.683 0.280
30 178.378 -16.023 -28.331 4.900 0.318 41.522 7.101 10.015 3.385 0.218
31 140.245 -53.477 -9.942 2.598 -0.018 27.866 29.161 10.443 3.707 0.103
32 -77.612 165.278 32.675 -0.240 0.326 81.474 94.291 18.791 3.852 0.128
33 97.507 -3.259 -11.012 3.000 -0.262 52.321 40.061 14.314 4.033 0.235
34 128.845 -25.432 -16.135 0.401 -0.242 33.770 18.550 7.899 4.169 0.196
35 152.096 -17.672 -9.477 -0.063 -0.258 8.805 2.985 2.428 1.331 0.068
36 121.434 18.885 -28.092 5.561 -0.357 39.239 41.897 21.442 14.266 0.378
37 143.942 3.143 -24.341 4.295 -0.809 87.682 24.271 8.928 3.954 0.199
38 177.458 -20.984 -19.413 3.644 -0.179 98.071 20.666 21.345 4.687 0.468
39 126.730 -1.637 -17.334 2.507 0.061 40.231 6.288 5.002 2.578 0.252
40 -127.276 194.954 38.088 -5.418 0.589 81.681 118.840 13.533 14.466 0.605
41 106.601 -18.391 -6.570 -1.653 0.397 42.970 30.057 11.409 4.360 0.352
42 319.653 -244.882 -61.566 -4.616 -1.253 52.187 54.742 13.745 1.819 0.311
43 125.474 -8.221 -13.667 -1.324 -0.023 58.368 23.329 17.617 6.464 0.129
44 153.780 -3.636 -14.180 9.800 0.016 50.065 4.303 9.591 4.958 0.356
45 66.493 27.830 -1.112 5.328 0.192 26.135 31.071 7.735 3.474 0.319
46 151.080 -77.654 -19.321 1.721 -0.181 38.606 54.635 7.879 3.191 0.252
47 96.466 -0.670 -7.976 -0.255 -0.191 9.905 3.411 5.130 3.668 0.294
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TABLE C1. Hospital-specific OLS estimates and standard errors (cont.)
b. Efficiency indicator: TEV
Hosp. Coefficient estimates Standard errors
no. CONST BEDS BUD ABF LONG CONST BEDS BUD ABF LONG
1 65.103 0.632 8.572 2.977 0.282 16.269 3.155 11.690 6.124 0.311
2 72.822 10.344 2.517 -1.335 -0.030 53.826 74.546 12.714 5.378 0.149
3 82.950 11.460 -2.491 3.424 -0.987 39.536 21.696 12.479 6.540 0.765
4 91.315 -18.122 -1.525 4.874 0.955 60.036 24.216 14.175 4.799 0.322
5 224.311 -190.793 -9.940 10.883 0.457 77.315 113.037 22.384 7.039 0.602
6 139.955 -11.423 -3.523 2.378 -0.425 112.758 41.448 9.369 5.425 0.194
7 172.461 -62.240 -17.683 22.842 0.071 142.539 136.798 17.027 19.247 1.049
8 5.501 37.812 25.907 -5.214 0.400 49.330 52.998 10.846 5.105 0.285
9 132.893 -4.472 -5.421 6.759 0.151 46.117 2.567 10.758 4.969 0.280
10 59.801 12.960 -12.438 19.430 0.229 48.804 29.943 6.949 4.920 0.112
11 146.321 -2.474 -19.514 24.343 -0.971 121.836 9.418 26.622 10.268 1.158
12 135.177 -29.931 -11.645 8.941 0.333 43.659 18.328 9.788 5.456 0.757
13 -83.759 44.788 22.883 0.922 1.103 72.261 22.586 11.147 3.382 0.423
14 51.813 15.045 6.973 13.852 0.218 43.631 61.815 9.815 5.732 0.430
15 45.067 -4.067 22.291 -1.297 0.210 22.819 8.865 9.093 4.848 0.274
16 53.828 -7.784 14.951 -11.901 1.582 60.425 8.907 8.207 5.348 0.632
17 88.083 3.802 -2.344 5.432 -0.501 24.731 1.134 6.740 3.036 0.558
18 147.715 22.992 -55.364 42.520 -2.087 60.377 17.701 23.608 15.001 1.024
19 5.629 19.253 28.162 -3.827 0.582 84.678 105.168 11.354 5.251 0.265
20 -5.853 4.873 20.290 -12.204 0.229 110.739 9.165 20.714 19.373 1.455
21 67.662 -3.660 15.479 -2.248 0.157 69.667 5.230 14.392 9.459 0.290
22 10.420 5.799 15.242 -0.871 0.269 15.444 1.693 4.346 1.932 0.054
23 57.986 -5.171 9.815 0.109 0.119 70.850 26.043 13.498 4.625 0.105
24 187.763 -172.275 -6.395 -1.427 -0.060 30.185 55.249 5.980 7.010 0.526
25 5.989 138.989 17.374 5.356 0.082 50.483 110.525 12.623 4.986 0.072
26 37.133 2.425 35.580 -13.577 -0.901 71.913 16.597 12.420 6.112 0.425
27 211.673 -128.301 -19.561 11.552 0.175 440.895 463.764 51.686 18.725 0.556
28 -3.034 123.470 17.301 4.579 -0.156 94.584 169.616 21.098 8.546 0.268
29 157.952 -85.852 -8.888 -3.445 -0.206 48.672 38.469 13.675 5.702 0.281
30 51.094 15.020 7.164 -9.025 -0.626 38.987 6.668 9.404 3.179 0.204
31 -49.888 68.216 47.575 -0.453 0.044 47.473 49.679 17.791 6.316 0.175
32 -178.658 243.147 67.201 -3.606 0.459 73.261 84.786 16.897 3.464 0.115
33 32.784 40.460 8.309 -0.363 -0.203 48.246 36.941 13.200 3.719 0.216
34 126.582 -23.177 -14.219 2.005 -0.507 64.543 35.454 15.098 7.967 0.376
35 174.028 -24.515 -8.426 -0.800 -0.550 33.908 11.496 9.352 5.126 0.261
36 150.819 -88.846 1.998 2.343 -0.171 54.480 58.170 29.770 19.806 0.524
37 95.393 7.145 -5.495 2.575 -0.590 77.651 21.494 7.907 3.502 0.176
38 202.038 -26.338 -26.442 10.901 -0.050 162.595 34.262 35.388 7.771 0.776
39 123.274 0.633 -8.539 -0.183 -0.261 35.819 5.598 4.453 2.295 0.224
40 -234.410 272.894 55.529 -8.744 1.793 116.223 169.098 19.255 20.584 0.861
41 -2.422 55.985 15.344 -4.420 0.733 43.660 30.540 11.592 4.430 0.358
42 240.786 -167.347 -33.320 -2.415 -1.470 64.688 67.855 17.038 2.255 0.385
43 -57.153 60.958 27.482 -1.312 0.321 85.521 34.182 25.812 9.471 0.189
44 52.472 6.291 -14.666 15.475 0.139 39.863 3.426 7.636 3.948 0.284
45 2.848 81.506 21.649 4.214 0.730 31.212 37.106 9.237 4.149 0.380
46 121.947 -57.800 -7.324 6.284 0.123 37.795 53.488 7.714 3.124 0.247
47 17.461 21.295 -7.733 26.186 1.293 24.101 8.298 12.482 8.925 0.714
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TABLE C1. Hospital-specific OLS estimates and standard errors (cont.)
c. Efficiency indicator: CEC
Hosp. Coefficient estimates Standard errors
no. CONST BEDS BUD ABF LONG CONST BEDS BUD ABF LONG
1 107.071 -2.300 -7.644 5.842 -0.359 20.780 4.030 14.932 7.822 0.397
2 74.571 1.689 0.843 -8.042 0.014 83.127 115.126 19.634 8.305 0.229
3 105.086 -14.837 -7.836 -4.381 0.149 17.213 9.446 5.433 2.847 0.333
4 181.215 -22.220 -30.614 7.029 0.132 38.904 15.692 9.185 3.110 0.208
5 159.392 -53.731 -19.703 6.263 -0.411 33.447 48.901 9.683 3.045 0.260
6 155.856 -11.222 -21.824 5.656 -0.147 63.396 23.303 5.267 3.050 0.109
7 168.069 -53.051 -22.157 11.804 0.441 66.434 63.759 7.936 8.971 0.489
8 87.082 3.294 -2.074 -5.342 -0.016 23.011 24.722 5.059 2.381 0.133
9 132.226 -5.188 -5.818 5.541 0.145 42.455 2.363 9.904 4.575 0.258
10 89.691 -19.520 -0.019 3.440 0.021 34.081 20.910 4.853 3.436 0.078
11 134.867 1.446 -23.067 10.463 -0.391 98.998 7.652 21.632 8.343 0.941
12 211.542 -56.131 -27.283 7.879 -0.621 31.175 13.088 6.989 3.896 0.540
13 146.619 -13.381 -18.975 -0.748 -0.257 70.182 21.937 10.827 3.285 0.411
14 137.485 -72.627 -16.630 11.633 0.016 44.377 62.872 9.983 5.830 0.438
15 115.627 -7.999 -12.917 -0.169 0.243 10.343 4.018 4.122 2.198 0.124
16 200.753 -17.752 -19.058 1.475 -0.333 107.727 15.880 14.632 9.534 1.127
17 135.130 -0.461 -21.383 7.467 -0.525 20.938 0.960 5.706 2.570 0.473
18 121.068 3.889 -23.998 5.506 -0.433 35.207 10.322 13.766 8.747 0.597
19 130.686 -90.178 13.152 -4.891 0.356 78.933 98.032 10.583 4.894 0.247
20 78.991 -1.295 -6.256 3.959 0.570 49.632 4.108 9.284 8.683 0.652
21 133.951 -3.685 -12.932 6.552 0.051 21.091 1.583 4.357 2.864 0.088
22 73.930 -0.969 -1.202 -0.560 0.142 34.713 3.806 9.769 4.342 0.121
23 113.334 -19.804 -3.345 -6.358 0.061 50.818 18.679 9.682 3.317 0.075
24 173.618 -112.342 -15.915 -1.220 -0.296 36.911 67.560 7.313 8.572 0.643
25 -5.048 183.799 7.610 5.438 0.099 51.587 112.941 12.899 5.095 0.074
26 95.563 -7.736 15.443 -15.171 -0.692 64.329 14.847 11.111 5.468 0.380
27 354.943 -262.715 -39.620 8.170 0.109 254.645 267.854 29.852 10.815 0.321
28 83.715 -49.800 3.418 14.226 -0.290 78.547 140.856 17.520 7.097 0.223
29 140.070 -35.388 -17.520 -3.173 -0.248 43.911 34.706 12.337 5.144 0.253
30 194.346 -17.202 -32.100 4.904 0.125 32.363 5.535 7.806 2.639 0.170
31 123.938 -35.805 -9.065 0.979 0.003 31.334 32.789 11.743 4.169 0.116
32 -69.212 155.415 30.721 -0.209 0.326 78.620 90.988 18.133 3.717 0.123
33 113.253 -16.602 -14.857 2.934 -0.306 49.658 38.022 13.586 3.828 0.223
34 119.640 -22.615 -13.545 -1.319 -0.251 27.616 15.170 6.460 3.409 0.161
35 148.054 -16.294 -14.758 3.985 -0.096 14.170 4.804 3.908 2.142 0.109
36 134.436 7.404 -33.789 9.646 -0.378 36.881 39.379 20.153 13.408 0.355
37 123.410 13.808 -31.590 5.272 -0.933 96.375 26.677 9.813 4.346 0.218
38 132.706 -12.096 -13.300 5.411 0.066 100.427 21.162 21.858 4.800 0.479
39 148.665 -3.402 -21.810 4.314 -0.083 38.630 6.038 4.803 2.476 0.242
40 -126.768 195.173 37.461 -4.946 0.584 87.634 127.502 14.519 15.520 0.649
41 122.658 -29.253 -10.223 -0.601 0.296 57.684 40.349 15.316 5.853 0.472
42 317.452 -244.857 -60.155 -4.918 -1.339 54.780 57.463 14.428 1.910 0.326
43 146.498 -15.408 -22.651 0.068 -0.010 57.941 23.159 17.488 6.416 0.128
44 175.214 -6.845 -10.942 6.385 -0.032 38.331 3.294 7.343 3.796 0.273
45 56.600 38.560 1.446 3.807 0.127 25.412 30.211 7.521 3.378 0.310
46 159.224 -93.583 -20.279 2.466 -0.147 42.091 59.568 8.591 3.479 0.275
47 97.917 -2.733 -7.495 -1.665 -0.224 8.615 2.966 4.462 3.190 0.255
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TABLE C1. Hospital-specific OLS estimates and standard errors (cont.)
d. Efficiency indicator: TEC
Hosp. Coefficient estimates Standard errors
no. CONST BEDS BUD ABF LONG CONST BEDS BUD ABF LONG
1 72.760 -3.714 8.616 4.336 0.048 16.289 3.159 11.704 6.132 0.311
2 61.304 12.840 6.407 -6.211 -0.050 67.921 94.066 16.043 6.786 0.187
3 70.945 9.522 2.266 -1.239 -0.661 30.570 16.776 9.649 5.057 0.592
4 120.535 -15.965 -12.636 6.358 0.484 56.939 22.967 13.444 4.552 0.305
5 232.604 -201.484 -11.476 10.824 0.540 77.142 112.783 22.334 7.024 0.601
6 150.239 -18.957 -3.373 6.116 -0.380 91.457 33.618 7.599 4.400 0.158
7 120.121 -19.809 -10.315 14.248 -0.175 110.555 106.103 13.206 14.928 0.814
8 8.427 39.635 21.131 -4.032 0.402 52.150 56.027 11.466 5.397 0.302
9 152.657 -5.719 -21.593 12.483 0.203 47.426 2.640 11.063 5.110 0.288
10 68.106 4.782 -11.339 13.405 0.211 50.037 30.699 7.124 5.044 0.115
11 31.557 7.970 -2.996 16.206 -0.018 53.345 4.123 11.656 4.496 0.507
12 83.741 -7.851 -0.666 5.092 0.167 32.842 13.787 7.363 4.104 0.569
13 -33.917 27.514 14.662 -0.045 0.865 57.511 17.976 8.872 2.692 0.337
14 44.744 18.554 8.668 13.868 0.287 45.426 64.357 10.219 5.968 0.448
15 52.964 -13.885 24.233 0.470 0.175 25.937 10.077 10.336 5.511 0.311
16 35.900 -1.003 7.139 -3.309 1.271 44.364 6.540 6.026 3.926 0.464
17 112.479 0.435 -11.634 7.464 -0.467 23.179 1.063 6.317 2.845 0.523
18 53.945 23.087 -24.568 26.298 -0.896 39.837 11.679 15.576 9.898 0.676
19 6.259 25.105 24.587 -3.803 0.531 72.765 90.373 9.756 4.512 0.228
20 77.072 -1.403 0.287 0.477 -0.444 69.972 5.791 13.089 12.241 0.919
21 8.199 3.374 6.688 5.286 0.233 22.020 1.653 4.549 2.990 0.092
22 -2.028 5.051 18.363 -0.792 0.211 10.460 1.147 2.944 1.308 0.036
23 35.830 2.140 13.144 -1.272 0.095 50.511 18.567 9.623 3.297 0.075
24 190.692 -185.006 -6.220 0.006 -0.048 40.980 75.008 8.119 9.517 0.714
25 1.315 152.197 12.521 10.430 0.029 87.827 192.285 21.960 8.674 0.125
26 -4.073 15.737 28.589 -12.170 -0.802 49.087 11.329 8.478 4.172 0.290
27 219.855 -137.676 -20.006 11.150 0.154 432.287 454.710 50.677 18.359 0.545
28 -31.232 170.918 21.335 4.889 -0.146 100.497 180.218 22.416 9.081 0.285
29 161.903 -90.215 -9.062 -3.637 -0.236 50.540 39.945 14.200 5.921 0.292
30 67.336 11.189 -2.109 2.695 -0.584 45.781 7.830 11.043 3.733 0.240
31 -40.072 66.552 41.718 0.274 0.051 47.445 49.650 17.781 6.312 0.175
32 -185.403 251.659 68.061 -3.106 0.458 71.861 83.166 16.574 3.398 0.113
33 24.251 46.400 10.479 -0.068 -0.208 48.796 37.362 13.350 3.762 0.219
34 115.342 -16.648 -12.242 0.150 -0.502 63.441 34.849 14.840 7.831 0.369
35 186.003 -31.195 -10.572 1.296 -0.627 56.150 19.036 15.486 8.488 0.432
36 149.208 -84.854 -0.199 5.130 -0.188 68.795 73.454 37.593 25.011 0.662
37 47.230 30.880 -20.573 9.311 -1.080 149.006 41.246 15.173 6.720 0.338
38 139.845 -17.189 -11.361 6.878 0.063 96.539 20.343 21.012 4.614 0.461
39 56.560 -0.229 4.027 3.498 0.341 37.846 5.915 4.705 2.425 0.237
40 -259.857 288.061 61.325 -11.588 2.038 121.945 177.422 20.203 21.597 0.903
41 -7.874 60.713 16.130 -4.898 0.696 42.314 29.598 11.235 4.293 0.347
42 218.386 -149.062 -24.447 -3.029 -1.680 84.096 88.214 22.150 2.932 0.500
43 3.641 35.617 8.949 -0.079 0.244 57.790 23.098 17.443 6.400 0.128
44 34.841 3.503 3.005 10.389 0.008 73.182 6.289 14.019 7.248 0.521
45 -49.237 139.504 34.332 1.969 0.534 28.593 33.993 8.462 3.801 0.348
46 108.855 -57.730 -1.604 6.200 0.124 54.745 77.475 11.173 4.525 0.357
47 23.217 18.121 -13.850 29.843 1.557 27.745 9.553 14.369 10.274 0.822
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TABLE C2. Coefficient of ABF dummy.
Ranking numbers and other supplementary statistics, by hospital
Hosp. Efficiency indicator: CEV Efficiency indicator: TEV
no. Est. Rank t-value Rank Pred. Rank Est. Rank t-value Rank Pred. Rank
coef. no. no. coef. no. coef. no. no. coef. no.
1 2.814 22 0.462 25 2.759 20 2.977 20 0.486 21 3.284 20
2 -8.719 46 -1.060 41 -6.906 46 -1.335 34 -0.248 34 -0.473 32
3 -7.255 44 -2.276 45 -5.546 45 3.424 19 0.524 20 3.520 18
4 8.634 7 2.216 4 6.149 8 4.874 16 1.016 15 3.176 21
5 5.727 13 1.804 9 4.852 10 10.883 10 1.546 10 9.622 9
6 1.802 25 0.502 24 1.445 24 2.378 22 0.438 22 1.640 25
7 8.934 5 1.013 14 3.789 13 22.842 4 1.187 13 13.823 5
8 -4.647 42 -1.517 44 -3.384 41 -5.214 42 -1.021 42 -4.025 43
9 4.252 18 0.633 22 3.351 15 6.759 12 1.360 12 4.797 13
10 6.418 11 2.252 3 4.366 12 19.430 5 3.949 1 14.905 4
11 14.861 1 1.621 10 8.176 4 24.343 3 2.371 6 17.973 2
12 8.027 9 1.956 8 7.297 6 8.941 11 1.639 9 7.680 10
13 -1.016 33 -0.299 35 -0.909 34 0.922 25 0.273 23 1.489 26
14 11.995 3 2.039 6 9.613 3 13.852 7 2.417 5 12.114 7
15 -3.592 39 -1.131 42 -2.902 40 -1.297 32 -0.268 35 -0.780 34
16 -0.965 32 -0.075 31 -1.877 37 -11.901 45 -2.225 46 -3.351 41
17 7.891 10 3.273 1 6.114 9 5.432 14 1.789 8 4.725 14
18 5.776 12 0.682 21 2.966 17 42.520 1 2.835 4 20.799 1
19 -2.106 37 -0.357 36 1.213 25 -3.827 40 -0.729 40 -1.017 35
20 -8.142 45 -0.593 39 -3.795 42 -12.204 46 -0.630 39 -6.253 44
21 8.673 6 2.428 2 6.358 7 -2.248 36 -0.238 33 -2.022 37
22 -0.948 31 -0.257 34 -0.352 33 -0.871 31 -0.451 37 1.699 24
23 -4.001 40 -1.225 43 -2.518 39 0.109 26 0.024 26 0.614 29
24 -1.447 35 -0.171 32 -0.141 31 -1.427 35 -0.204 32 -0.273 31
25 3.373 20 0.705 19 2.803 18 5.356 15 1.074 14 5.694 11
26 -18.158 47 -2.643 47 -12.480 47 -13.577 47 -2.221 45 -7.780 46
27 8.520 8 0.834 16 10.197 2 11.552 8 0.617 18 11.574 8
28 14.453 2 2.051 5 11.975 1 4.579 17 0.536 19 4.423 17
29 -3.501 38 -0.616 40 -2.076 38 -3.445 38 -0.604 38 -2.066 38
30 4.900 16 1.447 12 3.208 16 -9.025 44 -2.839 47 -7.355 45
31 2.598 23 0.701 20 1.823 22 -0.453 29 -0.072 27 -3.283 40
32 -0.240 29 -0.062 29 0.001 30 -3.606 39 -1.041 43 -2.748 39
33 3.000 21 0.744 18 2.802 19 -0.363 28 -0.098 29 0.271 30
34 0.401 27 0.096 27 0.530 2 2.005 24 0.252 24 2.168 23
35 -0.063 28 -0.047 28 -0.143 32 -0.800 30 -0.156 31 -1.903 36
36 5.561 14 0.390 26 1.742 23 2.343 23 0.118 25 3.478 19
37 4.295 17 1.086 13 3.748 14 2.575 21 0.735 17 2.679 22
38 3.644 19 0.777 17 1.094 26 10.901 9 1.403 11 5.037 12
39 2.507 24 0.972 15 1.948 21 -0.183 27 -0.080 28 1.166 27
40 -5.418 43 -0.375 37 -5.441 44 -8.744 43 -0.425 36 -13.490 47
41 -1.653 36 -0.379 38 -1.223 35 -4.420 41 -0.998 41 -3.791 42
42 -4.616 41 -2.538 46 -3.845 43 -2.415 37 -1.071 44 -0.666 33
43 -1.324 34 -0.205 33 -1.403 36 -1.312 33 -0.138 30 1.072 28
44 9.800 4 1.976 7 7.653 5 15.475 6 3.920 2 12.238 6
45 5.328 15 1.534 11 4.665 11 4.214 18 1.016 16 4.430 16
46 1.721 26 0.539 23 0.324 29 6.284 13 2.012 7 4.544 15
47 -0.255 30 -0.069 30 0.518 28 26.186 2 2.934 3 16.698 3
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TABLE C2. Coefficient of ABF dummy (cont.)
Ranking numbers and other supplementary statistics, by hospital
Hosp. Efficiency indicator: CEC Efficiency indicator: TEC
no. Est. Rank t-value Rank Pred. Rank Est. Rank t-value Rank Pred. Rank
coef. no. no. coef. no. coef. no. no. coef. no.
1 5.842 13 0.747 23 5.383 8 4.336 22 0.707 21 4.939 16
2 -8.042 46 -0.968 41 -6.050 46 -6.211 45 -0.915 44 -4.015 45
3 -4.381 40 -1.539 43 -3.073 41 -1.239 36 -0.245 35 -0.485 39
4 7.029 9 2.260 3 5.150 11 6.358 15 1.397 13 4.813 17
5 6.263 12 2.056 4 5.324 9 10.824 9 1.541 9 9.584 8
6 5.656 14 1.854 10 4.303 16 6.116 17 1.390 14 4.254 21
7 11.804 2 1.316 13 4.972 13 14.248 4 0.954 19 9.999 7
8 -5.342 44 -2.243 45 -3.688 42 -4.032 43 -0.747 40 -2.461 43
9 5.541 15 1.211 16 4.370 15 12.483 7 2.443 6 9.189 11
10 3.440 25 1.001 20 3.062 24 13.405 6 2.657 3 10.276 6
11 10.463 4 1.254 14 6.299 5 16.206 3 3.605 1 14.090 2
12 7.879 7 2.023 5 7.357 4 5.092 20 1.241 17 4.724 18
13 -0.748 35 -0.228 36 -0.500 37 -0.045 32 -0.017 33 0.877 31
14 11.633 3 1.996 7 9.310 3 13.868 5 2.324 7 11.625 4
15 -0.169 31 -0.077 32 0.051 31 0.470 28 0.085 27 1.060 30
16 1.475 28 0.155 29 -0.134 33 -3.309 40 -0.843 41 4.107 22
17 7.467 8 2.905 1 5.740 6 7.464 13 2.623 5 6.370 14
18 5.506 16 0.629 26 1.969 26 26.298 2 2.657 4 11.631 3
19 -4.891 41 -0.999 42 -0.477 36 -3.803 42 -0.843 42 -0.240 36
20 3.959 23 0.456 27 4.241 17 0.477 27 0.039 29 1.751 28
21 6.552 10 2.288 2 5.191 10 5.286 18 1.768 8 6.406 13
22 -0.560 33 -0.129 34 0.729 28 -0.792 35 -0.606 38 2.603 27
23 -6.358 45 -1.917 44 -4.310 44 -1.272 37 -0.386 36 -0.105 35
24 -1.220 36 -0.142 35 0.001 32 0.006 31 0.001 31 1.198 29
25 5.438 17 1.067 19 4.786 14 10.430 10 1.202 18 9.390 9
26 -15.171 47 -2.775 47 -10.032 47 -12.170 47 -2.917 47 -5.609 46
27 8.170 6 0.755 22 9.346 2 11.150 8 0.607 22 10.959 5
28 14.226 1 2.004 6 11.444 1 4.889 21 0.538 23 4.293 19
29 -3.173 39 -0.617 40 -1.957 40 -3.637 41 -0.614 39 -1.576 40
30 4.904 20 1.859 9 3.314 22 2.695 24 0.722 20 2.604 26
31 0.979 29 0.235 28 0.750 27 0.274 29 0.043 28 -2.132 42
32 -0.209 32 -0.056 31 0.092 30 -3.106 39 -0.914 43 -1.939 41
33 2.934 26 0.766 21 2.781 25 -0.068 33 -0.018 34 0.677 33
34 -1.319 37 -0.387 38 -0.582 38 0.150 30 0.019 30 0.605 34
35 3.985 22 1.860 8 3.191 23 1.296 26 0.153 26 -0.307 37
36 9.646 5 0.719 24 4.062 19 5.130 19 0.205 25 5.105 15
37 5.272 19 1.213 15 5.021 12 9.311 12 1.386 15 9.369 10
38 5.411 18 1.127 17 4.172 18 6.878 14 1.491 10 3.908 23
39 4.314 21 1.743 11 3.818 20 3.498 23 1.442 11 3.145 24
40 -4.946 43 -0.319 37 -4.795 45 -11.588 46 -0.537 37 -10.375 47
41 -0.601 34 -0.103 33 -0.233 34 -4.898 44 -1.141 46 -3.133 44
42 -4.918 42 -2.575 46 -3.803 43 -3.029 38 -1.033 45 -0.397 38
43 0.068 30 0.011 30 -0.594 39 -0.079 34 -0.012 32 0.742 32
44 6.385 11 1.682 12 5.420 7 10.389 11 1.433 12 8.893 12
45 3.807 24 1.127 18 3.584 21 1.969 25 0.518 24 2.817 25
46 2.466 27 0.709 25 0.673 29 6.200 16 1.370 16 4.285 20
47 -1.665 38 -0.522 39 -0.235 35 29.843 1 2.905 2 18.097 1
34
